Supreme Court Verdict in favour of Pension for Resignees!

Following is the Land Mark Judgement by Supreme Court for LIC employee!
It is 100% applicable to IBA.
Will UFBU take up this as most urgent subject and proceed to get Pension for the Resignees?
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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10251 OF 2014

ASGER IBRAHIM AMIN .. APPELLANT

VERSUS

LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA .. RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

1.  The question which falls for consideration is whether the Appellant is

entitled to claim pension even though he resigned from service of his own

volition and, if so, whether his claim on this count had become barred by

limitation or laches.

2 . The Appellant joined the services of the Respondent Corporation on

30.6.1967 on the post of Assistant Administrative Officer (Chartered

Accountant) at the age of twenty seven. He worked for 23 years and 7 months

in the Corporation before tendering his resignation on 28.1.1991, owing to

“family circumstances and indifferent health”, presumably having crossed fifty

years in age. The request of the Appellant for waiver of the stipulated three

months notice was favourably considered by the Corporation vide letter dated

28.2.1991, and the Appellant was allowed to resign from the post of Deputy

General Manager (Accounts), which he was holding at that time. We shall

again presume that the reasons that he had ascribed for his retirement, viz.

family problems and failing health, were found to be legitimate by the

Respondent, otherwise the waiver ought not to have been given. Thereafter, the

Central Government in exercise of power conferred under Section 48 of the

Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 had notified the LIC of India (Staff)

Regulations, 1960 and thereafter the Life Insurance Corporation of India

(Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “Pension Rules”)

which, though notified on 28.6.1995, were given retrospective effect from

1.11.1993. The Pension Rules provide, inter alia, that resignation from

service would lead to forfeiture of the benefits of the entire service including

eligibility for pension.

3.  On 8.8.1995, that is post the promulgation by the Respondent of the

Pension Rules, the Appellant enquired from the Respondent whether he was

entitled to pension under the Pension Rules, which has been understood by the

Respondent as a representation for pension; the Respondent replied that the

request of the Appellant cannot be acceded to. The Appellant took the matter no

further but has averred that in 2000, prompted by news in a Daily and

Judgments of a High Court and a Tribunal, he requested the Respondent to

reconsider his case for pension. This request has remained unanswered. It was

in 2011 that he sent a legal notice to the Respondent, in response to which the

Respondent reiterated its stand that the Appellant, having resigned from service,

was not eligible to claim pension under the Pension Rules. Eventually, the

Appellant filed a Special Civil Application on 29.3.2012 before the High Court,

which was dismissed by the Single Judge vide Judgment dated 5.10.2012. The

LPA of the Appellant also got dismissed on the grounds of the delay of almost

14 years, as also on merits vide Judgment dated 1.3.2013, against which the

Appellant has approached this Court.

4.  As regards the issue of delay in matters pertaining to claims of pension, it

has already been opined by this Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008)

8 SCC 648 that in cases of continuing or successive wrongs, delay and laches or

limitation will not thwart the claim so long as the claim, if allowed, does not

have any adverse repercussions on the settled third-party rights. This Court

held:

…………………………………………….

The legal position deducible from the above observations further amplifies that

the so-called resignation tendered by the Appellant was after satisfactorily

serving the period of 20 years ordinarily qualifying or enabling voluntary

retirement. Furthermore, while there was no compulsion to do so, a waiver of

the three months notice period was granted by the Respondent Corporation.

The State being a model employer should construe the provisions of a beneficial

legislation in a way that extends the benefit to its employees, instead of

curtailing it.

15.  The cases of Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 521;

State of M.P. v. Yogendra Shrivastava, (2010) 12 SCC 538; M.R. Prabhakar v.

Canara Bank, (2012) 9 SCC 671; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kirpal Singh,

(2014) 5 SCC 189; UCO Bank v. Sanwar Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 412 relied upon by

the parties are distinguishable on facts from the present case.

16.  We thus hold that the termination of services of the Appellant, in essence,

was voluntary retirement within the ambit of Rule 31 of the Pension Rules of

1995. The Appellant is entitled for pension, provided he fulfils the condition of

refunding of the entire amount of the Corporation’s contribution to the

Provident Fund along with interest accrued thereon as provided in the Pension

Rules of 1995. Considering the huge delay, not explained by proper reasons, on

part of the Appellant in approaching the Court, we limit the benefits of arrears

of pension payable to the Appellant to three years preceding the date of the

petition filed before the High Court. These arrears of pension should be paid to

the Appellant in one instalment within four weeks from the date of refund of the

entire amount payable by the Appellant in accordance of the Pension Rules of

1995. In the alternative, the Appellant may opt to get the amount of refund

adjusted against the arrears of pension. In the latter case, if the amount of

arrear is more than the amount of refund required, then the remaining amount

shall be paid within two weeks from the date of such request made by the

Appellant. However, if the amount of arrears is less than the amount of refund

required, then the pension shall be payable on monthly basis after the date on

which the amount of refund is entirely adjusted.

17.  The impugned Judgments of the High Court are set aside and the Appeal

stands allowed in the terms above. However, parties shall bear their respective

costs.

....signed